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Abstract 
 
This paper examines European Union (EU) causal mechanisms and policy 
instruments affecting the urban domain throughout the lenses of the 
Europeanization approach. Instead of looking at EU instruments that are 
formally/legally consecrated to cities, we use theoretical public policy analysis to 
explore the arenas and the causal mechanisms that structure the encounters 
between the EU and urban systems of governance. Policy instruments are 
related to policy arenas and in turn to different mechanisms of transmission 
thus originating a typology of European Policy Modes. The paper focuses on 
four different EU instruments in the in the macro-area of sustainable 
development and proposes potential game-theoretical models for each of them. 
In the conclusions we highlight the differences between this approach and the 
traditional analysis of EU urban policy, and suggest avenues for future empirical 
research based on typologies of policy instruments and modes of 
Europeanization. 
 
 
Keywords: actor games, analytic narratives, cities, Europeanization, policy 
analysis, causal mechanisms; 
 
 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION   
Cities have gained prominence on the economic and political stage in Europe. They are 
centres for accumulation and production of wealth, functioning at time as bulwark against 
the effects of market forces, at time as places of social and political inequalities (Brenner 
1999, 2004; Goldsmith 2003; John 2001; Le Galès 2002). The rise of international and 
European institutions has been matched by a transfer of regulatory authority downwards to 
sub-national territories, that is regions and cities, and in some circumstances, upwards in 
favour of supranational territorial configurations (Kazepov 2005; Lefevre 1998; Le Galès 
1998) 
The institutionalisation of the European Union has, at time, enhanced the political 
importance of the category “European City”, within a context where “European public 
policies, rules, procedures, conflict solving mechanisms, debates and norms, are now 
relevant to all cities within the EU” (Le Galès 2002: 96). The EU (European Union) 
provides innovative structures of opportunities for actors in urban systems of governance. 
This is a structure that cities can exploit to promote and develop their differentiated 
interests by drawing on multiple ways of interaction, both with other cities and with upper 
tiers of governments and regulation. Community Initiatives specifically targeted to urban 
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and city areas have affected the ways urban-level actors “think” about policy tasks and 
instruments. 
 The dismissal of specific programmes addressed to cities after 2007 and their 
incorporation into wider regional policies has opened up questions as to the place and role 
of cities and urban actors within the EU. In this connection, cities are also a key component 
of the attempts to create new loci of legitimacy for the EU and to learn via the open 
method of coordination by tapping the benefits of local knowledge (Sabel and Zeitlin 2008; 
Zeitlin and Trubek 2003). 
However, when researchers try to identify the policies of the EU affecting the urban 
political domains, almost invariably they look for those EU programmes with “cities” on 
the tin, that is, the policies formally identified as targeting the cities. This is a major pitfall, 
since the identification of the units of policy analysis is a task of the researcher, and often 
formal-legalistic definitions are misleading or incomplete. To illustrate, no serious researcher 
would think of studying the welfare policies of the EU by looking for the Commission’s 
units with “welfare” in their name or run a search on legislative datasets looking for 
“welfare”. Instead, she would most likely start from a theoretical definition of “welfare”, 
think about its applications to the EU domains, and then identify empirical manifestations 
of the conceptual constructs suggested by the literature. This is also the aim of this paper. 
Specifically, we shed light on different arenas, mechanisms and instruments of 
Europeanization of urban politics by adopting a conceptual perspective informed by 
theoretical policy analysis. This is particularly relevant, because most of the literature on 
cities has followed a kind of formal or legalistic approach. 
 
The general framework here employed is that of Europeanization. Such a perspective 
results to be particularly advantageous because, it is not only strictly related to the process 
of European Integration, but, besides that, it allows to highlight the modalities through 
which institutions at the European, national and local level, seek to influence decisional 
processes (Radaelli 2003). 
Within this framework, the focus is on the “European domestic policy” (Jeffery 2000) 
namely those domestic areas influenced by the European politics and policy making, as well 
as the institutional/policy relationships between the EU, the national and the sub-national 
levels. For the purposes of this article, Europeanization is defined as an interactive process 
wherein domestic systems of governance are in time changed by the diffusion of ideational constructs, legal and 
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social norms, regulations and instruments. These are first identified, negotiated, contested and agreed upon 
within the EU-wide arenas, and eventually used by domestic actors to shape their institutional orders. 
Emphasis is placed on the concept of “institutional orders”. We draw on Carter and Smith's 
notion of institutional orders as interactive mediations “between sectoral regulation, usage 
of territory and the reproduction of the EU polity” (Carter and Smith 2008: 266).  
In cities, Europeanization leads to an intensified political and economic interaction 
between actors at the territorial level, providing urban and city areas, and so their institutions 
and actors, with access to, and availability of, information, legitimacy and at times financial 
support. Partly for these reasons, social, economic and institutional actors across urban 
areas are experiencing an increasing involvement within mechanisms of governance 
characteristic of the politics, policies and polities of the European Union and of its Member 
States (Atkinson 2001; Chorianopoulos 2002; John 1996, 2000; Marshall 2003, 2005).  
 
The remainder of the paper will be organised as follow: after a brief literature review, we 
will draw on theoretical policy analysis and suggest a catalogue of mechanisms and arenas 
building on the literature on mechanisms of Europeanization and theoretical policy analysis. 
This will enable us to situate the EU policy instruments affecting urban politics and policy 
in a coherent framework of arenas and mechanisms.  
Having provided a conceptual overview of arenas and mechanisms, we will move to a 
parsimonious typology for the empirical analysis of Europeanization of cities, thus reaching 
the conclusion that despite the paucity of specific policy initiatives and programmes having 
an explicit “urban label”, there are several avenues and pathways through which cities 
encounter Europeanization. In section 4 we exemplify analytically the four modes of 
Europeanization, whereas the following section will present the design of our research, in 
particular the alternative hypotheses and analytical conjectures on the character of the 
different modes of policy. Section 6 concludes. 
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2. EUROPEANIZATION THE URBAN WAY 
The process of European integration is accompanied by the creation of a growing bulk of 
legislation, rules and policy initiatives that, with different degrees of influence, may impact 
on European cities. Additionally, the European Union official rhetoric often portrays cites 
as “powerful agents of legitimisation” (Le Galès 2007) by designating cities and urban areas 
as “target populations” (Schneider and Ingram 1993) of new dimensions of citizenship. The 
idea of “Europe of cities” is also one of the components of the European polity in this 
legitimising discourse.  
 
In spite of that, within the field of European Studies, academic research on the relations 
between cities and the EU has been practically confined to the Structural funds and 
Cohesion Policy (Marshall 2005; Zerbinati 2004), or to those policy programmes clearly 
holding the heading urban on their tin (Cento Bull and Jones 2006; Halpern 2005; Tofarides 
2003), thus neglecting other dimensions where the encounter between Europe and urban 
systems is, theoretically at least, likely to yield transformative effects. The emphasis is often 
on in-depth analysis of changes occurred within the institutional structure of local 
government, triggered by the involvement of the city in specific initiatives for urban 
regeneration – URBAN CI – or more extended programmes for regional development, 
where cities administrations act in synergy with upper levels of government. In 
consequence, this narrows focus may bias any possible generalisation on the extent and 
scope conditions of Europeanization of urban areas. These studies conceive of 
Europeanization mainly as a two-fold process of downloading new institutional models and 
uploading via policy networks and lobbying activities (Marshall 2005). The process of 
Europeanization of cities and urban areas is eventually described - rather than measured or 
causally explained – and the influence of the action of the European Union partly prejudged 
due to scarce accuracy paid to the causal mechanisms likely to trigger change within urban 
systems. An exception in this sense is represented by Zerbinati’s comparative analysis of 
Europeanization in Italy and England where attention is accorded to both direct and 
indirect potentials for EU to influence local authorities. However, also in this case the 
analysis limits its focus to structural policy, thus narrowing the possibility to generalise 
about the influence of the EU on urban systems. Somewhat different is the approach 
employed by Kern and Bulkeley in their study of transnational municipal networks in the 
context of local climate change policy. The character of local policy networks in the field of 
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climate change is considered as influenced by the process of Europeanization – thus 
assumed more as an explanans rather than the phenomenon to be explained. They portray 
municipal networks somehow as devices at disposal of cities to circumvent the power of the 
central state (Kern and Bulkeley 2009). Their study therefore examines the structure of a 
specific set of municipal networks, rather than exploring the encounter between cities and 
the EU.  
Urban policies, we submit, at both the domestic level and in the context of the 
European Union have instead to be considered as part of broader realms of public policies 
and their analysis should be therefore carried out accordingly. As claimed by Le Galès, “in 
analytical terms, it has been a common mistake to analyse urban policy as independent from 
changes in public policy in general” (Le Galès 2007: 13). This is particularly the case when 
the attempt is to assess the systems-actors interplay in the context of the EU policy making.  
On the other hand instead, within the field of urban studies, the role of the EU is 
generally confined to one of intervening variable within a process where Europe reduces to 
a mere functional context for the action of cities (Goldsmith 1993; Kübler and Piliotyte 
2007; Le Galès 2002). The European Union is therefore considered somewhat equally to 
other international governance contexts where cities and regions, due to an enlarged 
opportunity structure, are confronted with new channels for exercising “para-diplomatic” 
activities beyond the control of the central government. Sometime the action of the 
European Union is explicitly addressed and an attempt is made to seize the Europeanization 
of cities and urban areas; nonetheless the analysis is limited to accounting for the 
transanational activity of cities within network structures (Kübler and Piliotyte 2007). In 
these cases the analysis focuses on the intergovernmental relations between urban systems 
and other levels of governments within the hierarchically structured European polity - 
where cities are perceived as a lower level seeking to supersede the filtering power exercised 
by regional and central authorities. This kind of analysis, in turn, pays little attention, if any, 
to the policy action of the EU in terms of change of urban systems of governance. It 
neglects elements of research design and causation concerning Europeanization at the level 
of cities and local authorities1.  
                                                
1 For a review of research design issues in the field of Europeanization see Exadaktylos, T. and Radaelli, C.M. 
(2009) “Research Design in European Studies: The Case of Europeanization”, Journal of Common Market 
Studies 47(3): 507-30. 
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The literature suffers therefore from an overall lack of theoretically informed 
approaches to EU-related urban policies grounded on specific assumptions, which in turn 
has reinforced the tendency to preserve the dividing between European studies and urban 
studies, at least within the discipline of political sciences.  
 
Hence, to assess the nature of the process of Europeanization in the case of urban systems, 
there is a need, we contend, to look at different policy areas involving cities across Europe. 
However, this step has been somewhat hindered by the implicit shortcomings of the Multi 
level Governance approach (Marks et al. 1996). The tabloid version of MLG reduces the 
EU politics to the interplay between hierarchically ordered levels of governance, where sub-
national levels and central states are maintained as conflicting, due to the attempt of lower 
levels to evade “central control”. Thus, sub-national actors and institutions are usually 
treated as constituting a unique and static layer of governance (Carter and Smith 2008: 265-
266). To partially overcome these drawbacks, we draw on an approach grounded in Public 
Policy Analysis (Carter and Smith 2008). In particular, we will focus on the different 
European arenas – orders – of policy within which actors and institutions relate 
interchangeably in order to attain specific policy goals. Processes of interest formation, 
strategic decision-making and regulatory competition taking place over time in the context 
of policy orders have the potential to influence the character of Europeanization and 
eventually the features of domestic politics within different domains. Policy arenas, as well 
as the institutional and individual actors therein involved, have to be conceived as 
constituting dynamic systems, rather than clusters in fixed levels of governance. Therefore, 
attention is to be redirected towards the continuous distribution of power and “political 
assignment of authority” (Carter and Smith 2008: 266) within policy orders. The analysis of 
Europeanization of cities offers room for applying the “sharp public policy analysis tools” 
evoked by Carter and Smith by accounting for the nature and use of policy instruments, an 
approach that rarely has been used up until now. Focusing on policy instruments as well as 
on the mechanisms of transmission through which these instruments are likely to be 
promoted, and reacted to, allows to move beyond functionalist approaches by at the same 
time integrating the understanding of the new forms of networked governance (Rhodes 
1997) with the mechanisms for the control and direction of behaviour (Hood 1998).  
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Policy instruments and the value of mechanismic explanations 
For our purposes, a public policy instrument is defined as a “device that is both technical and 
social, that organises specific relations between the state and those it is addressed to, 
according to the representations and meanings it carries. It is a particular type of institution, 
a technical device with the generic purpose of carrying a concrete concept of the 
politics/society relationship and sustained by a concept of regulation” (Lascoumes and Le 
Galès 2007: 4). The definition of policy instruments that we use in this paper, which will 
guide the empirical assessment of Europeanization of cities and urban areas at a successive 
stage, builds on the argument that public policy instrumentation – maintained both as the 
set of problems posed by the choice and use of instruments and the effects produced by 
these choices (Lascoumes and Le Galès 2007) – yields its own effects as a consequence of 
the procedures for its selection, underpins specific reasons backing the choice of certain 
instruments over others as well as having inherent properties. This understanding contrasts 
in part with more functionalist orientations, which have traditionally characterised studies 
on policy instrumentation within the field of public administration (Salamon 2002). 
Public policy instrumentation, and in particular the process and dynamics leading to 
the selection and successive deployment of instrument, ought instead to be maintained as 
involving political choices and factors, in turn underpinning specific relations of power 
between the actors and institutions involved in their choice. Therefore, also policy 
instruments have to be considered as political constructs (Schneider and Ingram 1993) 
resulting from conflict over definitions of problems; instruments may be conceived of as 
institutional forms framing the interactions and behaviours of actors and organisations by 
affecting relations of power, by at the same time privileging certain actors and some 
interests over others (Lascoumes and Le Galès 2007). 
In this connection, a focus on mechanisms – here further dissected into mechanisms 
of change and mechanisms of transmission - results particularly important to highlight the 
constellation of entities and activities that are interconnected one another, thus bringing about 
specific types of outcomes (Hedström 2005; Hedström and Swedberg 1996; Machamer et 
al. 2000; Stinchombe 1991). Social mechanisms constitute powerful tools to attain the causal 
explanation of the phenomena under analysis. Specifically, mechanisms based explanations, 
as opposed to statistical explanations and cowering-law explanations, seem more precise 
and fine-grained in the fact that a reference to generative mechanisms allows to better 
distinguish between causality and coincidental association, by at the same time increasing 
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the understanding of the potential reasons triggering to the observed event or process 
(Hedström and Swedberg 1996). Yet, differently from other types of explanations, accounts 
based on social mechanisms bring the added value of revealing the processes underpinning 
the relationships under analysis (Bunge 1967, 2004; Falleti and Lynch 2009)2. Sorting out the 
potential generative mechanisms for change facilitates the task of specifying the causal 
agents at the basis of the observed relationship between the entities under analysis. Causal 
agents, at least at a basic level, correspond to individual actors; social mechanisms therefore 
refer to the causes and potential consequences of individual actions. (Machamer et al. 2000). 
Specifying the mechanisms at the bases of the encounter between cites and the 
European Union, thus triggering to the potential Europeanization of urban systems of 
governance helps to reduce theoretical fragmentation thus highlighting possible structural 
resemblances between processes. Furthermore, mechanisms - by connecting entities with 
activities in terms of the potential outcome they are supposed to regularly bring about – 
increase the possibility to sort out the causal relationships between a certain cause and its 
effect (Hedström 2005).  
Therefore, when we say “mechanisms of Europeanization” we refer to theoretically 
justified patterns of interaction that may bring about Europeanization. We do not prejudge 
the degree of Europeanization that may eventually occur. We do not even make the 
assumption that, since there is a theoretically derived mechanism that produces 
Europeanization, the mechanisms will operate. Indeed empirically, one may find 
constraining or countervailing mechanisms. Thus, we leave the question of “how much 
Europeanization” out of this conceptual exercise.  
Mechanisms may have a differential impact on the domestic (city) domains of policy 
(i.e. actors, instruments, resources, styles and cognitive structures of policies) and eventually 
on the political structures of urban areas (administrative, representative and 
cognitive/normative). Throughout the paper, the framework of Europeanization will be 
used to reveal causal mechanisms and the scope conditions at the bases of the encounter 
between cities and the EU wide policy making arenas.  
 
                                                
2 Similar arguments have been emphasised by other scholarships such as in Adcock, A. and Collier, B. (2001) 
“Measurement validity: a shared standard for quantitative and qualitative research”, American Political Science 
Review 95(3): 529-546.  
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We contend that when considering the range of programmes and policy initiatives 
promoted by the European Union - either those directly addressed to cities and urban areas, 
or instead those promoted in the context of wider actions having nonetheless the potential 
to influence the management of public policies within urban systems of policy-making - 
analytical attention should focus more narrowly on the commonalities and differences of 
policy programmes and initiatives on the basis of the sets of instruments deployed between 
different macro-areas of policy. 
In turn, policy instruments, whether considered in isolation or instead as specific 
combinations (sets) within larger programmes of policy underpin different sets of 
mechanisms for their transmission. A well-known mechanism of Europeanization is the 
goodness of fit (Borzel 1999; Cowles et al. 2001). Bringing forwards the discussion, Knill and 
Lehmkuhl contend that the range of mechanisms is broader (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002). 
Their set of mechanisms includes Europeanization by explicit adaptational pressures - 
institutional compliance - considered as the principal mechanisms characterising those policy 
areas of “positive integration” (Scharpf 1999), regulatory competition and framing domestic 
beliefs and expectations. Additionally, there are situations in which the action of the 
European Union can affect national systems of policy even in the absence of clear EU 
directives of regulation. It is actually the case of those areas of facilitated coordination. Here 
domestic actors, notably national governments, are the key actors (Bulmer and Radaelli 
2005), and mechanisms of learning and discourses legitimisation trigger transformation within the 
EU as an arena for the exchange of best practice and ideas.  In this case the principal 
mechanism through which Europeanization is eventually brought into existence is learning. 
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3. APPLYING THEORETICAL POLICY ANALYSIS TO THE STUDY OF URBAN SYSTEMS IN EUROPE 
Building on the previous discussion, in this section we devise a series of potential 
mechanisms for the Europeanization of urban areas as associated to different modes – 
domains – of policy, through which the “encounter between cities and the EU” is supposed 
to occur.  This is an exercise based on simple deduction and classification, but useful to 
explore causality3. To understand how causality works, we have to consider causal 
mechanisms of change, mechanisms of transmission, and accompanying dynamics. Table 1 
illustrates this framework. 
 
Tab. 1 Mechanisms of Europeanization of cities and urban areas 
 
 
To overcome the limitations of the current literature, instead of looking at legal/formal 
definitions of EU urban policy, we have proceeded from a much wider scanning of the 
ways in which EU policy affects urban policy and politics. Specifically, we have drawn on 
                                                
3 For a similar catalogue-like approach see Knill, C. and Lehmkuhl, D. (2002) “The national impact of 
European Union regulatory policy: Three Europeanization mechanisms”, European Journal of Political Research 
41: 255-80. 
 MECHANISMS OF 
CHANGE 
MECHANISMS OF 
TRANSMISSION 
ACCOMPANING DYNAMICS 
M
ec
ha
ni
sm
s 
of
 
Id
ea
ti
on
 
Soc ia l i sa t ion 
→ 
Leg i t imis ing d is courses  
→ 
Ref l exiv i ty -Soc ia l  l earning 
→ 
Del iberat ion and Framing 
 
 
- Communication; 
- Benchmarking; 
- Policy learning/transfer; 
- Promotion of new 
paradigms and tools of 
governance; 
- Transfer of best practices; 
- Networking; 
- Twinning; 
- Extrapolation; 
- Partnerships; 
- Active citizenship; 
- Expert networks; 
- Trans-national “scrutiny”; 
- Cities as target populations; 
M
ec
ha
ni
sm
s 
of
 
D
is
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
Strateg i c  Bargain ing 
→ 
Negot ia t ion 
 
 
- Institutional framing; 
- Programming; 
- Targets compliance; 
- Territorial rescaling; 
- Institutional re-scaling; 
- Institutionalisation of weak ties; 
- Public Private Partnerships; 
- Policy integration; 
- NPM-type tenets; 
- Urban/regional/state/rural relations; 
M
ec
ha
ni
sm
s 
of
 
Co
or
di
na
ti
on
 
Coordinat ion 
→ 
Cooperat ion  
- Self-regulation; 
- Cooperative Learning; 
- Targets Compliance 
(Standardisation); 
 
 
- Benchmarking Information; 
- Comparative Analysis; 
- Peer Review; 
 
 
M
ec
ha
ni
sm
s 
of
 
Re
gu
la
ti
on
 
Pareto  e f f i c i ency  
→ 
Regulat ion 
→ 
Col l ibrat ion 
- Regulatory competition; 
- Regulatory compliance; 
- Performances; 
- Impact Assessment; 
- Shared competences (other public 
actors; private sector); 
- Public Private Partnerships for the 
provision of services; 
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the literature on policy types (Anderson 1997; Gormley 1986; Lowi 1964, 1972; Spitzer 
1987; Van Horn et al. 2001) and the literature on mechanisms of Europeanization (Eberlein 
and Radaelli 2010; Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002), as well as on the discussion on the logic of 
choice and the logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 1998). 
Nonetheless, researchers willing to explore the dynamics of Europeanization, that is, 
how the EU affects or do not affect the local systems of policy and politics, need more than 
a catalogue based on abstract causal mechanisms. Therefore, building on the above 
assumptions and approaches, we develop, in turn, the argument that the process of 
Europeanization at the urban level depends on the Mode of Policy to which the set of programmes or single 
initiative considered is associated with. It is therefore useful to elicit from the previous discussions 
the core variables that explain change. The previous section seems to suggest that the two 
core variables concern the status of actors' preferences and the nature of strategic 
interaction.  
The variables can be outlined as follows.  The first (a) – preferences - concerns the initial 
arrangements of preferences that can be endogenous - and thus subject to change due to 
processes of learning and socialisation in situation where actors behaviours are mainly 
guided by a logic of appropriateness -, or instead exogenous - therefore leaving actors with 
bargaining options, for their most part dictated by a logic of choice. The other dimension 
(b) – nature of strategic interaction – deals with the distribution of payoffs from 
Europeanization. This dimension can be, in turn, systematised through a continuum where 
one pole is represented by zero-sum games - where either the values at stake are mainly 
social values therefore hardly negotiable, or the process of interaction is likely to generate 
winners and losers from Europeanization (Thatcher 2004). The other pole is positioned 
within the Pareto frontier.  
The combination of (a) and (b) thus originates a four dimensional space that constitute 
a typology for the EU modes of policy – or modes of Europeanization -, which chimes with 
current theorisation on the EU modes of governance (Borras and Jacobsson 2004; Eberlein 
and Kerwer 2004; Héritier 2002, 2003; Treib et al. 2005). 
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Table 2. The space of EU Policy Modes 
 
DISTRIBUTION OF PAYOFFS FROM EUROPEANIZATION 
 
ZERO SUM GAMES 
Winners and Losers from 
Europeanization 
PARETO OPTIMALITY 
Europeanization on the Pareto 
frontier 
Social Values 
 
 
Efficiency 
 
ENDOGENOUS 
Preferences 
can change 
 
Appropriateness 
(1) 
THICK LEARNING/REFLEXIVITY 
 
 
(2) 
REGULATION 
 
 
EXOGENOUS 
Preferences are 
given 
 
 
LO
G
IC
 O
F 
PR
EF
ER
EN
CE
S 
 
 
Choice 
 
(3) 
BARGAINING 
 
 
 
(4) 
COORDINATION 
 
 
 
One advantage of table 1 is that it shows that the arenas or domains of interaction are 
indeed four and not three as previously outlined. Another is that each of the cells of the 
typology can be associated with modes of interaction well known to the literature on 
governance and policy coordination. A third advantage consists in the fact that policy 
instruments can be observed dynamically. Depending on how they are implemented at the 
local level, they can move from one cell to another, thus revealing alternative modes of 
interaction as well as the mechanisms underpinning them. The four modes as presented in 
the typology partly overlap with types of policy well known by the literature. In particular, 
modes of regulation presents characteristics to many extends similar to those featuring in 
Lowi’s regulatory arenas (Lowi 1964, 1972) as well as many of the defining properties that 
feature the sub-types of regulative policies suggested by Gormley in terms of “hearing 
room”, “hoperating room”, “street level” and “board room” politics (Gormley 1986; Van 
Horn et al. 2001). Bargaining as mode of policy can be instead paired with distributive and 
redistributive arenas of policy as suggested by the literature, whereas thick-
learning/reflexivity modes can be identified as interactive attributes of ideational arenas, 
which are to consider as a distinctive mode only for typological and analytical purposes. 
Ideational components, in fact, are generally maintained as characteristic of different 
domains of policy as well as diverse phases of the policy process, as for instance showed in 
studies of policy areas of regulation and regulatory regimes. Regulative arenas, in fact, are 
grounded in rulemaking practices: their logic of change is based on Pareto-efficiency and 
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market-preserving mechanisms. In part, this overlaps with ideational mechanisms since 
Pareto-efficiency is one of the legitimising discourses of the EU (Majone, 1992). 
 
 
Modes of Europeanization and Policy Instruments  
Not only do policy domains characterise for different procedural dynamics of interaction 
between actors and mechanisms for the transmission of EU-related policies in the localities, 
but they can also be distinguished on the basis of sets of policy instruments to be associated 
to single areas of policy within each of the domain. A policy instruments perspective (Hood 
1983; Salamon 2002) looks at the instrumentation governments are endowed with – in this 
case the European Union – rather than solely focusing on the procedures through which 
decisions are taken or instead on the whole range of activities performed. This is particularly 
convenient within a realm – urban policies – where the European Union does not have a 
specific formal competence and where interactions between “cities” and the EU are likely to 
take place within multiple policy areas and during different stages of the policy process.  
Our argument in this occasion is that different sets of policy contribute to determine 
the character of different domains of policy through which the process of Europeanization 
of urban politics is expected to have effects. Examples in this sense are the series of green 
papers and communications published by the European Commission in different policy 
fields. Another example is the different “fora” for discussion and exchange of policy ideas, 
such as URBACT II support programme, the LIFE project in the field of environment, the 
CIVITAS Forum in the field of transport or by the CONCERTO forum for the exchange 
of ideas in the field of energy efficiency. These instruments can be considered as 
preponderantly ideational, thus conforming to logics of learning and reflexivity. However 
they have the potential to trigger alternative logics – bargaining and regulation – in case they 
are endowed with financial provisions and/or eventually rules of implementation.  
Further, inherently regulative instruments, such as the EU rules on public procurement, 
the water framework directive or the waste framework directive are often evolving in their 
ideational elements, which may eventually substantiate into forum for discussion and 
learning between actors involved in the implementation at the local level. Yet another 
example is instruments having a distributive nature – mostly substantiated in structural 
programmes – which despite reflecting modes of interaction in line with bargaining and 
coordination, are likely to be paralleled by dynamic of learning and reflexivity, both before 
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the actual negotiation of the funds and afterward during the phase of implementation and 
assessment of the programmes.  
 
To sum up then, this analysis suggests some different mechanisms at work, and enables us 
to situate existing EU policy programmes and instruments which are likely to have an 
impact effect on urban systems of governance in a coherent framework. In a second phase, 
EU policy instrumentation substantiated in specific programmes, initiatives and regulations 
– as potential catalysts for Europeanization of politics within cities and urban areas - can be 
compared throughout their development on the basis of the theoretically grounded 
typology for the modes of Europeanization.  
 
 
Actor constellations and Archetypal Game representations 
Drawing on Scharpf’s interaction-oriented policy research programme, the purpose of our 
research is “to identify the set of interactions that actually produces the policy outcomes 
that are to be explained” (Scharpf 1997: 43), which are eventually part of processes of 
Europeanization of different arenas within urban systems. Since we are mainly concerned 
with the character of the encounter between the EU policy making and cities in Europe, 
what is relevant are the action resources within different institutional orders (Carter and Smith 
2008), therefore the rules establishing competencies, right of participation and eventually 
prescriptions in the specific policy process taken into consideration. In turn, as specified in 
the previous sections, actors – individual or collective – are characterised by their strategic 
action orientations that we name as EU – ideal typical - Policy Modes (Table 2). Thus, what 
really matters is the assemblage – constellation – of actors involved in the policy interaction 
upon a specific policy issue. Yet, building on Scharpf, a constellation “describes the players 
involved, their strategy options, the outcomes associated with strategy combinations (in 
terms of payoffs), and the preferences of the players over these outcomes” (Scharpf 1997: 
44). A constellation therefore takes stock of the potential conflict but it is not 
comprehensive of the mode of interaction or the mechanisms through which the conflict is 
likely to be resolved. Following this, a “game theoretic representation” assumes, the form of 
a combination between a “specific actor constellation” forming in specific circumstances 
and in the course of a definite lapse of time (both to be defined during the research) and a 
specific “mode of interaction” and the mechanisms therewith pre-emptively associated. 
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However, it is relevant to highlight how both aspects of the game – actors’ constellation and 
mode of interaction – can vary independently from one another, and both have explanatory 
power.  
 
Fig. 1 Interaction‐oriented policy research: the domains 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: personal elaboration from Sharpf 1997: 44     
 
To paraphrase Scharpf “what matters in the present context is that the explicit 
conceptualisation of actors constellations provide the crucial link between substantive 
policy analysis and interaction-oriented policy research” (Scharpf 1997: 45), with the overall 
intention of revitalising Lowi’s call for a political theory that will treat “policy” as an 
independent variable influencing the types of politics that will be encountered.  
The same therefore apply for the other modes of interaction characterising the 
typology at the bases of the analytical framework for this research, each of which can be 
theoretically paired with a different mixed-motive games situations (or variable-sum games) “in 
which the preferences of players are partly harmonious and partly in conflict” (Scharpf 
1997: 73)4.  
 
                                                
4 Scharpf distinguishes mixed-motive games from the simple situations of pure conflict (zero-sum or constant sum) 
games in which one side must lose what other side gains and situations of pure coordination, in which all actors 
can maximise their own payoffs by agreeing on concerted strategies. He differentiates in particular amongst 
four “archetypal” constellations well know in game-theoretical studies in terms of “ Assurance”, “Battle of 
Sexes”, “prisoner Dilemma” and Chicken”.  
Institutional orders 
Policy Environment 
 
Actors 
 
Constellations 
 
Modes of 
Interaction Problems Policies 
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4. DISCUSSION: empirical demonstrations 
In this section we take stock of the four policy modes as sorted out in the previous 
typology by considering the plausible strategic interaction that generate around the 
deployment of different EU instruments of policy, which in differentiated ways have the 
potential to influence different policy components within urban systems of governance. 
For each of the instruments chosen as the proxi for the empirical investigation of the ideal 
policy modes (modes of interaction in Scharp’s language) we shall propose an initial 
archetypal game constellation to exemplify in game-theoretical terms the set of strategic 
interaction taking place within each of the modes as well as the payoffs distribution that 
arise from each of these games.  
Two sets of considerations need nonetheless be recalled before proceeding with the 
analysis. On the one hand, although actor-constellations represent the set of actors involved in 
particular policy interactions, they do not the automatic association with the mode of 
interaction through which potential conflict is to be resolved (Scharpf 1997). On the other 
hand, constellations and therefore the institutional orders within which they form and 
evolve are different from one another according to diverse issues of policy – we claim – as 
well as between one context of analysis and the other (cities for our research interests). 
Therefore, in empirical research constellation requires to be constructed by the analyst 
on the bases of available data and by closely looking at the territory under investigation. In 
this connection, the cells of the matrixes through which games constellations are 
exemplified, represents the outcomes stemming from the encounter between the strategic 
choices of interdependent actors. As evoked by Scharpf, “game theory as such can provide 
no help in identifying outcomes and their valuation by the ‘players’; the empirical and 
theoretical work necessary to describe them must have been done by the researcher before 
it makes sense to draw up game matrices” (Scharpf 1997). 
Moreover, to avoid the problem of over-complexity deriving from the multi-actors 
nature of interactions thus implying the impossibility to translate such constellations into 
the form of two-by-two matrixes with single-numbered payoffs, the analyst may resort to 
the two mechanisms of decoupling and aggregation. Whether the former implies the reduction 
of the, any interdependencies that occur to a reduced number of recognisable 
environments of interaction, aggregation should lead to the reduction of multi-persons 
interactions to relations between few “corporate actors”.  
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Modes of Ideation: the case of the EU Covenant of Mayors 
Cell 1 in our typology better describes situations characterised by endogenous distribution 
of preferences and a tendency for interactions leading to zero-sum games. Therefore, within 
arenas of thick learning or reflexive governance the main research question is about the scope 
conditions for reflexivity (via discourse or sustained interaction, as well as thick socialisation 
and/or frame reflection). Reflexivity dynamics carry the strongest potential for transforming 
zero-sum games and situations of stalemate within the decision making over specific policy 
issues into possible cooperative arrangements (Lenoble and Maesshalck 2006).  
 
Archetypal Game model 
Arenas where learning and reflexivity are the principal mechanisms of interaction may be 
exemplified through different games of Cheap Talk and more generally to the class of 
imperfect information - signalling games – involving interaction between a more informed 
agent, the sender (i.e. the EU, the Commission in our case) and a less informed agent, the 
receiver. In this sense, the main difference between games of signalling and cheap talks lies 
in the fact that cheap talk is generally considered as communication between players, which 
does not directly affect the payoffs of the game, whereas in signaling sending certain 
messages may be costly for the sender depending on the state of the world. In a Cheap Talk 
game, messages have no direct impact on payoff functions. If the Receiver ignores the 
message, the Sender’s payoff is unaffected by the message. If the Receiver acts, though, that 
might affect the Sender. Usually, these are coordination games, where the Sender’s 
preferred Receiver-action, given the true state of the world that he knows, is positively 
correlated with the Receiver’s preferred Receiver-action. 
However, the action of the sender might affect the payoff for both parties by changing 
the action taken by the receiver. There are cases, in fact where the conveyed information is 
not exogenous private information and cheap talk is indeed used to coordinate action, 
without, nonetheless guaranteeing efficiency in games; even unlimited chap talk does not 
necessarily lead to Pareto-efficient outcomes (Farrell and Rabin, 1996). 
 
Empirical appreciation 
The EU Covenant of Mayors, for instance, is an initiative of the European Commission that 
gives the lead to Europe’s “pioneering cities to mitigate climate change through the 
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implementation of intelligent local sustainable energy policies that create stable local jobs 
and increase citizens” quality of life and address crucial social issues5.  
In this case, the signatories local administrations commit themselves to put in place 
concrete measures and projects. Signatory cities accept to report and being monitored on 
their implementation of the Action Plans. They also accept termination of their 
involvement in the Covenant in case of non-compliance. Cities also commit to allocating 
sufficient human resources to the tasks, mobilising society in their geographical areas to take 
part in implementation of the action plan, including organisation of local energy days, and 
networking with other cities.  
The European Commission has committed unilaterally to recognising cities involved in 
the Covenant and provide for their public visibility. The Commission has implemented and 
funded the Covenant of Mayors Office, which provides technical and promotional support, 
including implementation of evaluation and monitoring tools, mechanisms to facilitate 
sharing of know-how between territories and tools to facilitate replication and 
multiplication of successful measures.  
 
Dynamics of interaction characterising reflexive domains of policy find their foundation in 
those theories predicting the possibility of transformative change of preferences. Change is 
generated by processes of socialisation and discursive interaction between individual and 
institutional actors (Adler 2002, 1997; Checkel 1998; Ruggie 1998), stressing the importance 
of language, norms and inter-subjectivity (Checkel 2005; Christiansen et al. 2001) and the 
political role of legitimising discourses (Schmidt 2008; Schmidt and Radaelli 2004). The 
preferences of political agents are endogenous, thus subject to change due to general 
processes of reflexivity or social learning (Checkel 1999) in the European-wide policy-making as 
well as within and between cities. Other key mechanisms through which conflicting 
preferences of actors involved over policy issues generate reflexivity are deliberation (Elster 
1998) and framing (Schon and Rein 1994), defined as “the process of selecting, emphasising 
and organising aspects of complex issues according to an overriding evaluative or analytical 
criterion” (Daviter 2007: 654). 
 
 
                                                
5 http://www.eumayors.eu  
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Modes of Regulation: waste management policy in the EU 
Cell 2 exemplifies instead situations of non-fixed preferences where the overall objective of 
interaction around policies is to attain procedural efficiency. Therefore, regulation as mode 
of governance typifies this domain.  
 
Archetypal Game model 
The conditions that characterize this mode of policy and the set of interactions that 
wherein potentially occur can be analytically represented by a Battle of the Sexes game, and 
more generally to the class of games of coordination with conflict over distribution. 
According to the logic of the game, the parties involved in the interaction have a common 
interest in coordinating their choices in order to reach a 
welfare-superior outcome (n.e./s.w.) although the 
parties involved are initially orientated towards different 
options. In particular, if the game is played as a non-
cooperative one with simultaneous moves in the 
absence of prior communication there is no certainty of 
reaching the preferred outcomes (n.w.). 
Communication and binding agreement do not solve 
nonetheless these difficulties; in fact, disagreement over 
the coordinated outcomes would still persist. Hence, agreement over outcomes is 
eventually reached since both side still prefer to accept the less attractive outcome rather 
than falling in a situation of non-coordination. In our case though, interaction is more 
likely to be played out conforming to a non-cooperative but sequential game. The party 
that has the first move (the European Commission in the specific case) can select its most 
preferred outcome and it would be in the other part’s best interest to coordinate on the 
same outcome.  
 
Empirical appreciation 
The EU policy for waste management is significant in this sense. In fact, different types of 
regulation revealed necessary to face the problematic implications of the growing 
production of waste and to reduce the types of waste produced as well as to endure a 
design of new products that would facilitate waste recovery afterwards. Nonetheless, this 
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regulation does not always take the form of command and control instruments; instead it 
can include economic and fiscal instruments as well as industrial codes of conduct 
(Chalmers, 1994). 
Hitherto, only few “command and control”-like measures have been adopted towards 
the excessive accrual of waste. In this connection, one of the most relevant attempts is 
represented by the enforcement of the Directive on Packaging and Packaging waste6, 
officially published on 20 December 1994. The Directive requires that, by 31 December 
2001, by weight, specific targets for packaging waste recovery have to be attained; 
additionally, within these general targets, there are other targets to be reached in terms of 
recycling of waste, with further specifications for each packaging material. The Directive is 
accompanied by a series of supporting measures to help achieve these goals. Exceptions are 
moreover envisaged for some Member States7. For the gist of our investigation it is 
important to highlight how, a policy of this kind, and above its overall success, does not 
merely rely upon the deployment of regulatory instruments, but also on “behavioural and 
attitudinal changes” (Chalmers, 1994: 277) that require the participation of a wide range of 
actors, including local authorities and private individuals. This implies the intensification of 
the relations between the Community – and the EU policy-making more generally – and 
these actors.  
 
Domains where regulation is the characteristic mode of interaction have a rank of values at 
stake that is not disputed and eventually composed by actors, neither through processes of 
socialisation and discourses legitimisation, nor by means of forms of strategic bargaining 
and negotiation. The set of preferences within this domain can be initially considered as 
either endogenous – thus subject to change through technocratic argumentation – or 
exogenous. But here, the defining character of policy action is its tension towards 
preserving efficiency over equity. Two main sets of procedural mechanisms can be 
maintained herewith in operation, that is regulation and efficiency, which in turn underpins 
more specific dynamics for the delegation of regulatory authority (Majone 1994) to third 
parties in insulation from the electoral cycle, thus seeking legitimacy through administrative 
                                                
6 Council Directive 94/62 EC, OJ 1994 L 365/10. 
7 Because of their specific situation, i.e. respectively the large number of small islands, the presence of rural 
and mountain areas and the current low level of packaging consumption, Greece, Ireland and Portugal, must 
aim to recover lower targets of packaging waste and meet the recycling targets by 31 December 2005. Art 
6(5). 
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procedures (Majone 1996). In the case of regulatory policies, the role of central 
governments, especially the role played by the EU, can be thought as one version of 
collibration, defined as “an intervention by government to use the social energy created by 
the tension between two or more social groupings habitually locked in opposition to one 
another to achieve a policy objective by altering the conditions of engagement without 
destroying the tension – unless deliberately” (Dunsire 1993; 12). The functioning of 
regulatory arenas is often identified with Pareto-efficiency. Regulatory regimes attempt to 
reach policy efficiency through differentiated moving of actors towards the Pareto frontier, 
as showed by several explanations of international regulatory regimes (Krasner, 1991). 
 
 
Modes of distribution: the Community Initiative URBAN II 
Cell 3 features situations where preferences are fixed and interaction is likely to end in 
situations of zero sum games. Extended processes of bargaining are the only way forward 
in terms of composing preferences, often via conflict management through side payments 
or by using a kind of “veil of ambiguity” to settle on long-term solutions that are amenable 
to short-term bargaining (Eberlein and Radaelli 2010). The theoretical foundation of this 
policy mode is the rational choice paradigm of fixed and conflicting preferences that need 
to be aggregated – via the two variants of issue based aggregation and arena based aggregation – or 
instead transformed within different issues and over time (Eberlein and Radaelli 2010). 
Interaction over policy issues thus can take the general form of bargaining, negotiation, and 
cooperation (Keohane 1984: 12). Particularly relevant in the case of cities involvement 
within the EU-wide policy-making are therefore mechanisms of bargaining, especially over 
policy programmes having considerable net distributive effects.  
 
Archetypal Game model 
Interaction, in this case can be paired – at least initially – to game models of bargaining in 
non-cooperative situations; the original model proposed by Rubinstein (1982)8 well 
exemplifies this set of games, where the players involved (the bargainers) interact in 
reiterated ways. In the negotiation of structural funds, local representatives are often 
                                                
8 Rubistein draws his model from the simple situation of two individuals with several possible agreements but 
with different interests as to the way of reaching agreement.  
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involved in the phase of domestic consultation, and only in “second facie” at the 
supranational level when dynamics of grand bargaining can be considered completed (Pollack 
1997; Sandholtz 1992). Another way to conceive interaction within distributive arenas is to 
think of a series of nested games (Tsebelis 1990) taking place within different arenas of 
governance, where actors’ suboptimal strategy in one game can be part of a strategy to 
maximise payoffs when all arenas are taken into account. This in turn may imply the shifting 
of arenas, thus moving to a different set of decisions and orders (Héritier and Lehmkuhl 
2008) or instead strategies for the creation of sub systemic arenas where partial positive-sum 
games may be reached within an overall situation of disagreement (Radaelli and Kraemer 
2008). Cities-EU interactions may also conform to mechanisms of “two-level games” 
(Buchs 2008; Putnam 1988). 
 
Empirical appreciation 
Due to their involvement in EU-led urban programmes, and particularly in the Community 
Initiative URBAN – during the programming period 1994-1999 and 2000-2006 - European 
cities reacted to both the new opportunities offered, and the constraints sometimes 
accompanying the EU-grants (Atkinson, 1999; Halpern, 2005; Marshall, 2005). 
Between 1994 and 1999 URBAN I Initiative financed programmes in 118 urban areas 
with a total of EUR 953 million of Community assistance, 3.2 million people lived in the 
supported areas and projects focused on rehabilitation of infrastructures, job creation, 
combating social exclusion and upgrading of the environment. With a total budget of EUR 
730 millions, projects for sustainable economic development and social regeneration were 
co-financed under URBAN II in 70 urban areas throughout Europe (CEC, 2003).  
Differently from the first edition, over the second round the financial equipment 
decreased substantially and URBAN became a mono-fund program, financed exclusively by 
the ERDF. Building on the positive experience of the first edition, URBAN II is based on a 
series of Commission guidelines for financing projects aimed at improving living conditions, 
creating jobs, integrating the socially excluded, developing environmental friendly public 
transport and facilitating the use of information technologies in cities (CEC, 2000). Key 
features of URBAN CI are the integrated to urban regeneration and the direct involvement 
of local authorities in the management and implementation of programmes.  
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Modes of Coordination: Air quality control in Europe 
Cell 4 - coordination - represents arenas characterised by the fixed distribution of preferences, 
where nonetheless, there are gains from cooperation to be exploited. Coordination as a 
specific mode of interaction - differently from the alternative modalities indicated in our 
typology - has been partly overlooked, and in turn, its nature remains rather under-
theorised.  
 
Archetypal Game model 
Modes of coordination, can be generally represented, we maintain, by the well known 
Assurance game9, where players have a clear common interest in coordinating on common 
efficient options, hence providing both of them with their best possible payoffs (n.w.). As 
such, the game features the character of games of pure coordination; we need nonetheless 
to account for the risk-factor involved. If, for instance, 
one of the two parties chooses to defect, then the other 
part that has decided to “cooperate” will end up with 
the worst possible outcome (n.e.). The game in his 
simplest form reminds of the great importance of 
actors perceptions and mutual predictability in social 
interactions. IN this connection, if the player that ahs 
decided to cooperate is unable to trust others 
understanding of the common situation, it would be logically led to defect in order to avoid 
the worst-case outcome of a cooperate/defect situation. If also the other player in our 
example should be persuaded by the same initial uncertainty, then both would end up with 
an overall second-worst outcome solution (s.e). There are two pure strategy equilibria. Both 
players prefer one equilibrium to the other - Pareto optimal and Hicks optimal. However, 
the inefficient equilibrium is less risky as the payoff variance over the other player’s 
strategies is lower. Specifically, one equilibrium is payoff-dominant while the other is risk-
dominant. 
                                                
9 “Assurance game” is a generic name for the game more commonly known as “Stag Hunt”. The French 
philosopher, Jean Jacques Rousseau, presented the following situation. Two hunters can either jointly hunt a 
stag (an adult deer and rather large meal) or individually hunt a rabbit (tasty, but substantially less filling). 
Hunting stags is quite challenging and requires mutual cooperation. If either hunts a stag alone, the chance of 
success is minimal. Hunting stags is most beneficial for society but requires a lot of trust among its members. 
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Empirical appreciation 
The EU policy for air quality control may be referred as a plausible domain where assessing 
coordination as a mode of policy. Specific analytical reference can be made to Council 
Directive 1999/30/EC relating to limit values for sulphur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide and 
oxides of nitrogen, particulate matter and lead in ambient air, constitutes, we argue, an 
instrument apt for investigating this mode of policy. The directive was is the so-called “First 
Daughter Directive”. The directive describes the numerical limits and thresholds required to 
assess and manage air quality for the pollutants mentioned. It addresses both PM10 and 
PM2.5 but only establishes monitoring requirements for fine particles.  
Despite presenting similar feature to “regulation” as a mode of interactions, for our 
purposes – at least in the phase of theoretical elaboration - coordination can be maintained as 
a specific and theoretically grounded mode of policy. In this case, the set of preferences 
available to actors is exogenous and, as in the case of regulation the rank of values at stake is 
not disputed and eventually composed by actors, neither through processes of socialisation 
and discourses legitimisation, nor by means of forms of strategic bargaining and 
negotiation. Two prevailing sets of procedural mechanisms are herewith in operation in 
terms of action coordination and cooperation. Examples in this sense are represented by the 
promotion and affirmation of various EU measures aimed at promoting better regulation. In 
this case, the instruments in which the better regulation agenda in grounded are “soft” in 
character and there are advantages for the parties deriving from the partial coordination of 
their reciprocal action and the exchange of ideas over policy alternatives. The preferences at 
disposal of actors are not compulsorily subject to change and change is conditional upon 
advantages gained from process of learning through cooperation; this, in turn, may lead to 
reforms to be undertaken domestically. 
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5. DESIGN OF THE RESEARCH: a proposal 
Having outlined four distinct domains of interaction, allows for the dynamic analysis of 
policy instruments associated with specific policy initiatives or programmes within each of 
the cells. Instruments and policy programmes, although initially coupled with one arena – 
domain - or another, are expected to move across cells. This builds on the assumption that 
EU policy instruments, differently substantiated into policy programmes and regulations – 
and in their provisions - that are likely to affect cities in the European Union, can be 
initially conceived as mainly ideational, regulative or distributive in character and therefore 
organised accordingly. When, however, we use the classification to select a specific policy 
programme for empirical research, the dynamic analysis of the process of Europeanization 
may well show that instruments reveal different modes of interaction and therefore change 
“cell” in the typology. 
 
Therefore, we assert that the character of the process of Europeanization of urban systems, 
depends on the nature of strategic interaction, and not instead on the legal “tools” explicitly 
designated for cites. In turn, the nature of strategic interaction, as the combined resultant 
of two dimensions, namely the initial distribution of preferences and the gains form 
Europeanization has been systematised, so as to originate a typology for EU policies 
modes.  
According to this hypothesis the policy action of the European Union allows for 
potential transformation to be triggered within the policy making of urban systems of 
governance also in the context of policy areas not targeting cities in explicit ways. Instead, it 
is argued – partially against the literature endorsing Multi Level Governance as the main 
framework for analysis – the interaction between cities and the EU (and in turn the 
transformative effects that this interaction can bring about within urban systems) can be 
better interpreted by considering the arenas (orders) of policy within which actors and 
institutions relate interchangeably in order to attain specific policy goals. In particular, this 
hypothesis calls for considering the nature, use and development of sets of EU policy 
instruments that substantiate in different policy programmes and initiatives.  
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Expectations on the encounter between cities and the European Union 
By taking into consideration both the variables as suggested in the typology, the alternatives 
as regards the prevailing modes through which the encounter between urban systems in 
Europe and the EU is likely to occur as well as the expectations about the scope of the 
process of Europeanization (when detectable) it is hence possible to suggest an analytical 
grid of prima facie evidence for the encounter between cities and EU based on the four 
“modes” previously devised. Therefore, the table includes expectations about the prevailing 
causal mechanisms for change and transmission that can be associated to each of the four 
modes sorted out as well their accompanying dynamics (as presented in table 1); together 
with the prevailing mechanism of change the features of the logic of action and preferences 
have been grouped as “common interaction characteristics”. Expectations are additionally 
formulated as to the structures of governance of the encounter between cities and the EU. 
Thus, the four modes – and moreover interaction taking place over the deployment of 
policy instruments – can reveal differences based on the approach to implementation (rigid 
vs. flexible), the nature of conflict over resources (material vs. standards), the character of 
proceduralisation (low vs. strong), the level of transparency and the nature of deliberation 
over policy issues. Furthermore, the modes are likely to characterise by different structures 
of actors (“politics” dimension), both in terms of main sets of actors involved (EU-
National-Local/Public-Private/Technocratic-Political), the organisation eventually assumed 
by networks (Hierarchical vs. differentiated geometry), and the type of access to network 
structures (Stable vs. Open). Finally, other distinguishing features relate to the prevailing 
institutional structure of interaction (market-like vs. hierarchies) and the locus of authority 
(central vs. dispersed). 
Although the main purpose of the investigation is to assess the nature of the process 
of Europeanization of the policy making of European cities on the basis of the type of 
policy instruments promoted by the EU, some conjectures (or expectations) about the 
“extent” of the process can be nonetheless formulated. Therefore, four main expectations 
can be devised as follows: 
 
EXP 1: When the prevailing mode is “Reflexive”, stakes are big and Europeanization is 
expected to be robust and potentially durable 
 
EXP 2: When the prevailing mode is “Coordination”, stakes are generally small and 
Europeanization is expected to be robust 
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EXP 3: When the prevailing mode is “Bargaining”, stake is big and Europeanization is 
expected to be contingent 
 
EXP 4: When the prevailing mode is “Regulation” the stakes are rather irrelevant and 
Europeanization is expected to be contingent on compliance patterns. 
 
Table 3 in Appendix sorts out these expectations. 
 
To summarise, the advantages of this conceptual exercise lie in the use of public policy 
theories to identify the “modes of policy”. We have thus theoretically justified the presence 
of four distinct spaces, instead of solely three as showed by the examination of the 
literature on Europeanization and policy types. This, in turn, allows for the formulation of 
alternative rival hypothesis as to the prevailing modes of Europeanization of urban areas 
(or the prevailing modalities of interaction via which the encounter between the EU and 
cites occur) and for devising conjectural expectations about the scope of the process of 
Europeanization at the urban level. Furthermore, the four modes of policy can be 
represented through an analytical grid of “prima facie evidence” useful to make better 
sense of the expected outcomes and to guide the empirical assessment of the policy 
instruments that will be then selected for the analysis. Finally, such a typology represents a 
starting point for case selection and the dynamic-empirical analysis of Europeanization as it 
applies to cities and urban areas in Europe. 
 
 
Method: Process Tracing and Analytic Narratives 
The question of research design when attempting to assess the impacts of the EU upon 
domestic systems is, we claim, of paramount relevance. In this connection, baseline-type of 
enquiry relying on “top-down” accounts run the risk of reducing Europeanization to solely 
the analysis of the impact of EU decisions on the domestic institutional system, thus 
drawing the parallel “European action/direct effects” by considering the domestic effects 
of independent variables defined at the EU level. This could lead to prejudging the 
significance of EU variables, whereas proponents of other approaches stress the 
importance of rooting Europeanization in the context of its eventual manifestation, and of 
explicitly treating the issue of causality (Radaelli 2003). 
Those claiming for a bottom-up or inside-out perspective through process-tracing based 
on temporal causal sequences, aim to assess “whether”, “when” and eventually “how” the 
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action of the EU policy-making has effectively brought about change within each of the 
components of the domestic system by, at the same time attempting to measure the scope 
and direction of change starting from the target dimensions (Radaelli 2004). Thus, 
Europeanization is not conceived uniquely as a process of progressive adaptation to the 
EU model according to classical theories of public policy implementation. Europeanization 
assumes the character of a system of processes eventually altering the domestic opportunity 
structure over time. Europe - contended more as a systems to be “encountered” by 
domestic actors and systems of institutions - can assume, at times, the character of a 
constraining model to which domestic systems should adapt, often times it represents a 
sets of resources, opportunities for re-define and re-orient discourses and political action at 
the domestic level (Radaelli and Pasquier 2007: 37-38). In this case, EU-level variables are 
maintained as exogenous to the context of analysis, thus, EU policy and politics are not 
considered as the independent variables. In fact, to be producing effect of 
Europeanization, EU-level interactions need to become yardsticks for political action 
within domestic systems by means of both socialisation effects and policies/politics that 
progressively alter the logic of domestic political action. 
In turn, the empirical analysis starts from the set of actors, problems, rules, styles, 
ideas and outcomes at the domestic level at a given time - T0 - to be then process-tracing the 
domestic system of interaction over a certain lag of time in an attempt to identifying those 
critical junctures or turning points in the context of which major changes take place under 
the form of ideational transformations, alterations of the structure of actors, yet as 
problems re-definition (Radaelli and Pasquier 2007). To make inference from the 
contribution of exogenous variable, research proceeds backwards-up from the domestic to 
the EU, so as to control patterns to establish the nature of causal influence on domestic 
structures. EU variables have to be then further considered, so as to establishing their 
actual importance within the domestic system; their role can be in fact one of facilitator or 
instead bond, and at times they can be source of learning for domestic actors, yet factors 
bringing to the possible alteration of the domestic structure of opportunities. “Causality is 
then examined in vivo by looking at temporal causal sequences” (Radaelli and Exadaktylos 
2009).  
 
For the gist of this work, the analysis via the process-tracing of single cases allows for 
better unravelling and eventually testing the mechanisms structuring the encounter between 
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cities and the EU and eventually triggering the process of Europeanization within urban 
systems, so as to reveal possible causal processes within the same case (George and 
McKeown 1985). Additionally, the method of process tracing seem to adapt fruitfully to 
different theoretical framework (i.e. social constructivisms, rational choice and delegation 
theory in our case), by at the same time allowing for exploring the decisional process 
through which some initial conditions translate into certain outcomes later on in time 
(George and Bennet 2005). Therefore, the objective is to formulate, and eventually test, 
“middle-range” theoretical propositions able to avoid the intrinsic pitfalls of “a-theoretical 
descriptive narratives”, without pretending on the other hand to lead towards the 
formulation of  “universal law of human behaviour that hold across all time and places” 
(George and Bennet 2005). The overall purpose becomes instead the discovering and 
observation of the causal mechanisms connecting dependent and independent variables in 
each of the particular context considered, so as to test theories in situations characterised 
by complex effects of interaction and multiple causality, wherein the task of explaining 
outcomes in terms of a reduced number of independent variables is a rather difficult one 
(Hall 2003).  
Therefore, process-tracing analysis is a particularly suitable method for studies where 
the main objective is to give a certain degree of historical relevance to the formal theories 
at the bases of the analysis, thus giving importance to elements such as stories, accounts 
and contexts. An example in this sense if offered by the work of Bates and his colleagues, 
whose analytic narratives combine analytical tool of economics and political science – rational 
choice theory and game theory – with the narrative form commonly used in history (Bates 
et al. 1998).  By focusing on concrete historical cases, where the main interest is to explore 
the choices of individuals who are embedded in specific settings, their analysis proceeds by 
tracing the “sequence of action, decisions and responses that generate events and 
outcomes”. The approach of analytic narratives, although informed by deductive reasoning, 
seeks to account for outcomes via the identification and exploration of the mechanisms 
“behind” them. This, in turn is made by considering time and place and by locating and 
tracing the processes that generate the outcome of interest. By isolating and unpacking 
such mechanisms, analytic narratives offer structural accounts paying attention to the 
identification of “the actors, the decision points they faced, the choices they made, the paths taken 
and shunned, and the manner in which their choices generated events and outcomes” 
(Bates et al. 1998: 13-14).  
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Relevant for the construction of narratives informed by a rational choice approach is 
the consideration of structural contexts, namely the “broader structural arrangements that 
represent the contextual component of social action” and that are treated as dynamic 
targets enduring “throughout a given event sequence” (Pedriana 2005: 356). The contextual 
framework provides then the theoretical link between historical processes and the social 
actors that guide their development.  
In particular, the analysis proceeds by first modelling a portion of the critical dynamics 
of interest in a way coherent with the hypothesis and ideas governing the overall research. 
Following that, through the narrative, a single case is used to test the hypotheses and to 
eventually generate new hypotheses that can be generalised. As such, the method of 
analytic narratives would endeavour to develop and test theory-driven models, thereby 
employing “theory to gain deeper insight into the complex working of the real world” 
(Bates et al. 2000).  
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
Although a formal urban policy of the European Union does not exist yet, and it is very 
unlikely to come to light for the time being, it is nonetheless possible to produce theoretical 
conjectures on the influence exercised on cities and urban areas by the action (formal as 
well as less direct and informal) of the EU through its policy instruments.  
In contrast to the classic view of the cathedral based on EU instruments that have 
“city on the tin”, we have set out to explore an alternative, more encompassing view. In 
particular, the article has drawn on the “sharp public policy analysis tools” advocated by 
Carter and Smith, and has then used the initial catalogue of mechanisms and arenas to 
consider four ideal-typical modes. These modes - NOT the policies legally defined, as EU 
initiatives for the cities - are the theoretical places wherein the Europeanization effects can 
be traced, by examining public policies and their instruments across time. 
 
One advantage of our proposal is to extend the range of instruments that are (potentially at 
least) vehicles of Europeanization way beyond the limited “city-level initiatives” considered 
by the traditional view of the cathedral. Another is to enable us to reflect theoretically 
about governance, interaction, and logics of political behaviour, thus setting the ground for 
theory-grounded expectations of how urban governance is affected by the action of the 
European Union. Further, the typology contributes to the literature on modes of 
governance, policy instruments and Europeanization by showing how the urban dimension 
can be integrated in the analysis. By doing so, our approach makes the urban dimension 
fully comparable with other territorial domains in which Europeanization effects have been 
studied. Further research could integrate our typological exercise with the vibrant literature 
on EU modes of governance and EU policy instruments (Kassim and Le Galès 2010). 
Finally, the article has proposed to consider policy instruments not merely in terms of 
their intended outcomes, as usually suggested by functional explanations, but rather as 
complex devices ensuing from conflict and specific modes of interaction (Lascoumes and 
Le Galès 2007).  
Some cautious words are in order, however. First, we have to acknowledge that this is 
a proposal of a modest character. It is one of the possible ways to theorize 
Europeanization at the city level. It brings the cost of high abstractions about logics, 
preferences and other concepts. Empirical work has often shown that these neat theoretical 
distinctions melt when researchers attend to careful empirical reconstructions of processes 
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of changes. So, the second limitation is that it is not clear at this stage whether the proposal 
is a wide net to catch and sort out different empirical manifestations of Europeanization, or 
can also generate causal predictions that are testable. Third, although we have moved away 
from multi-level governance, it remains to be seen what applications of this alternative view 
of the cathedral may bring in terms of re-assessing the theoretical status of multi-level 
governance. Therefore, the proposal outlined here needs to be corroborated by further 
analysis as to the scope conditions for Europeanization, a further specification of its 
observable implications and above all testable conjectures on the potential transit of the 
EU policy instrumentation from one domain to another, thus facilitating the collection of a 
sufficiently broad number of data for carrying out empirical analysis. 
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